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1. The Resurgence of Contractual Dumping in Labour Litigation
In recent years, the phenomenon of contractual dumping has forcefully returned to the forefront of labour litigation, particularly in the context of private procurement contracts. Although not a new practice, it appears to be increasingly widespread and is typically implemented through the application of alternative national collective bargaining agreements in place of those historically established in the relevant productive sectors, characterised by inferior economic and regulatory conditions. The repercussions are significant not only in terms of workers’ protection, but also with regard to fair competition and overall market balance.
Against this backdrop, the Order of the Milan Labour Court dated 4 December 2025 was issued, following proceedings brought by Filcams-CGIL Milan against a company which, after being awarded a private procurement contract, failed to apply the so-called “leading” collective agreement. The company initially applied the AISS Security Agencies National Collective Agreement signed by UGL, and subsequently replaced it with the SAFI National Collective Agreement, signed solely by UILTUCS-UIL, which had in any event expired in 2015 and had been definitively terminated in 2022.
2. The Relevant Legal Framework: Article 29, Paragraph 1-bis, of Legislative Decree No. 276/2003
The case was assessed in light of Article 29, paragraph 1-bis, of Legislative Decree No. 276/2003, as introduced by Decree-Law No. 19/2024. The provision establishes that:
“Workers employed in procurement and subcontracting arrangements must be guaranteed overall economic and regulatory treatment not inferior to that provided for by the national and territorial collective bargaining agreement stipulated by the trade union organisations of workers and employers that are comparatively most representative at national level.”
According to the Milan Labour Court, a breach of Article 29, paragraph 1-bis, does not merely result in individual harm to workers, but also constitutes anti-union conduct pursuant to Article 28 of the Workers’ Statute (Law No. 300 of 20 May 1970). The provision assigns to the comparatively most representative trade unions a safeguarding role against wage dumping, legitimising their intervention whenever the application of inferior collective agreements distorts the rules governing the labour market. The infringement therefore affects not only the individual worker’s right to adequate treatment, but also the institutional role of trade unions as guarantors of fair working conditions and instruments of labour market regulation.
3. Criteria for Identifying the “Benchmark” Collective Agreement
Of particular importance is the method adopted by the Court to identify the “benchmark” collective agreement. The judge relied on collective bargaining coverage data published by CNEL, using such data as an objective parameter to assess the representativeness of the signatory organisations. The most relevant indicators included:
- number of union members;
- territorial coverage;
- role within institutional bodies;
- actual application of the agreement within the sector.
Based on these indicators, the Court identified the National Collective Agreement for Private Security and Safety Services, signed by Filcams-CGIL, Fisascat-CISL and Uiltucs-UIL, as the leading agreement for the sector. This qualification was further confirmed by reference to the Ministry of Labour decree of 8 August 2024, which adopted the wage levels of that collective agreement as the benchmark for determining average hourly labour costs in public procurement.
Once the reference agreement had been identified, the Court ordered a court-appointed expert assessment (CTU) comparing it with the collective agreement applied by the company, including in light of ANAC guidelines on public procurement.
The expert assessment based the comparison on both economic equivalence criteria (basic pay, additional monthly payments, allowances, severance pay) and regulatory equivalence criteria (sickness, maternity, workplace injury, holidays, overtime and part-time work).
Equivalence of protection is deemed to exist where the overall economic value of the fixed components of annual gross remuneration is identical and any deviations from the parameters relating to regulatory protections do not exceed a threshold of two.
The analysis revealed significant differences between the two collective agreements, excluding equivalence for the entire reference period both in terms of economic and regulatory criteria.
4. Consequences of the Decision
In light of these findings, the Court issued the Order providing for:
- the obligation to apply economic and regulatory treatment not inferior to that provided for by the leading collective agreement, subject to a daily penalty of EUR 100 in the event of delay;
- a finding of anti-union conduct by the employer pursuant to Article 28 of Law No. 300 of 20 May 1970, thereby recognising the trade union’s effective regulatory role in the field of procurement contracts.
Why This Decision Matters
The ruling represents a strong signal in favour of protecting workers employed within procurement and subcontracting chains, contexts in which price-based competition frequently results in reduced economic, regulatory and safety protections.
The principles affirmed are also highly relevant for labour inspection activities, providing clear guidance for comparing the collective agreement applied by an employer with that concluded by the comparatively most representative organisations.
In conclusion, the Milan Labour Court’s Order strengthens the role of the “leading” collective agreement as a legal safeguard for labour protection in procurement contracts and confirms that a breach of the obligation under Article 29, paragraph 1-bis, of Legislative Decree No. 276/2003 may constitute anti-union conduct, with significant consequences for employers.
